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1. Introduction  
As the Internet grows, networks become larger and more complex, and the number of 
components, such as routers, switches, and fiber cables, increases. In complicated network 
systems, it is difficult to implement global network management across several Internet 
service providers (ISPs) that use a lot of network components in a large-scale network 
topology. Fault management is a particularly important network management issue in 
complex network systems because the Internet has become essential to business and 
research. However, we are only beginning to learn how to deal with global network failures 
in large networks. 
Failures have been reported in Sprint Internet protocol (IP) backbone, which shows that 
failures can be observed in everyday operation (Iannanccone et al., 2002; Markopulou et al., 
2004). However, the network failures observed by (Iannaccone et al., 2002) and 
(Markopoulou et al., 2004) were short-lived and small scale, and their impacts were 
analyzed only in the context of a single ISP. Most network backup or fault restoration 
methods have been studied and proposed for the various layers such as wavelength 
division multiplexing (WDM), multi-protocol label switching (MPLS), or IP (Fumagalli & 
Valcarenghi, 2000; Gerstel & Ramaswami, 2000; Ramamurthy et al, 2003; Saharabuddhe et 
al., 2004; Sharma & Hellstrand, 2003). Yet, the proposed backup and restoration methods 
have not been fully implemented and deployed in the real network. Since real networks are 
more complicated than theoretical ones, the impacts of network failures on users and ISP’s 
cannot be completely predicted and analyzed. Significant network failures due to natural 
disasters such as earthquakes, floods, or fires could have particularly wide impact on 
several ISPs. 
We discuss the results of the critical network failures that occurred after the Taiwan 
earthquake in Dec. 2006, which cut fibers and caused network failures. We also explain how 
restoration methods such as automatic border gateway protocol (BGP) (Lougheed & 
Rekhter, 1989) re-routing, BGP policy change, and switch reconfiguration were conducted. 
We hope that the experience and knowledge we gained during the process of recovering 
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from this huge natural disaster, which affected the global Internet, can be shared and can 
contribute to future Internet network management research. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first detailed study of network restoration after global network failures due to a 
natural disaster. 
Although many natural disasters have occurred in the 21st century, until recently there had 
been no simultaneous outage of the global Internet backbone. However, the earthquake that 
occurred around Taiwan in 2006 made several Asia Pacific Research and Education (R&E) 
networks unreachable. At 21:26 and 21:34 on December 26th (UTC+9), 2006, there was a big 
undersea earthquake off the coast of Taiwan twice, which measured 7.1 and 6.9 respectively 
on the moment magnitude (Hanks & Kanamori, 1979). This earthquake caused significant 
damage to the undersea fiber cable systems in that area. Several ISPs were affected because 
each cable system is shared by multiple ISP’s. This earthquake had the effect of dividing the 
Asia Pacific R&E networks into an eastern and a western group. The Asia Pacific R&E 
networks were, in particular, seriously damaged but were fully restored after several 
restoration steps, including automatic BGP re-routing, BGP policy changes, and switch port 
reconfigurations, were taken. 
The first step in recovery after the earthquake was taken automatically by BGP routers, 
which detoured traffic along redundant routes. In BGP routing, there are usually multiple 
redundant AS paths. Redundant BGP routes have served as backup paths but have 
provided poor quality connectivity, i.e., long round trip time (RTT). Because of the 
congestion on the narrow-bandwidth link that was subsequently reported, operators took 
manual control of traffic to improve communication quality. The second step was a traffic 
engineering process intended to prevent narrow-bandwidth links from filling up with 
detoured traffic. The operators changed the BGP routing policy related to the congested 
ASs. In spite of the routing-level restoration, a few institutions were still not directly 
connected to the R&E network community because they had only a single link to the 
network. For these single-link networks, the commodity link was used temporarily for 
connectivity. However, the commodity link was not stable and not sufficient to carry a huge 
amount of bandwidth or to provide next generation Internet service. To restore the single-
link networks, cable connection configurations at the switches were changed. 
The fiber break caused by the Taiwan earthquake raised restoration issues related to BGP re-
routing. In such an emergency, the backup routes should be chosen based on available 
bandwidth and RTT. Since the fiber break required an urgent network recovery process, 
network operators configured re-routing based on their experience with bandwidth and RTT. 
From this experience, we have learned that redundant physical backup links and routes are 
important to providing bandwidth and connectivity and that the Quality-of-Service (QoS) 
after recovery is also important. From the viewpoint of restoration after network failures, 
there are still challenges that cannot be automatically overcome by network management 
systems. A systematic risk management plan that includes collaboration among operators of 
the next-generation Internet is needed. 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, the Asia Pacific R&E networks that 
were damaged by the earthquake or related events are introduced. Section 3 introduces the 
R&E connection especially in Asia Paicifc area and the issues caused by such inter-connectivity 
of R&E networks. Section 4 is a detailed report of the network failures that were observed after 
the earthquake. Section 5 describes the processes to restoring the disrupted communications in 
the area. Section 6 discusses what we have learned from the observation of the network 
failures and recovery processes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.  
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2. Research and education network activities in the Asia Pacific area 
2.1 Asian Internet Interconnection Initiative (AIII) 
When AIII (Asian Internet Interconnection Initiative [AIII], n.d.) started in 1996, this project 
was the first next generation Internet R&E network in Asia. The basic idea of AIII is to 
provide Internet services via satellite. There are AIII members in TH, MY, ID, and SG (Tbl. 
3). NP also recently joined the project. The AIII's major effort is to build up the access points 
of non-broadband networks. In Asia, it was very hard to complete the network over 
telephones lines, and preparing earth stations represented a better chance of accessing the 
Internet. The biggest drawback of this project is that the total bandwidth is limited to 
between 1.5 and 8 Mbps. In 1996, 2 Mbps was enough bandwidth to start research activities. 
Now, however, even 8 Mbps is insufficient for network technology research activities. These 
days, AIII concentrates on developing and deploying certain advanced technology on their 
network, for example, IPv6 unicast, IPv6 multicast, Uni Directional Link Routing (UDLR), 
and advanced TCP. 
2.2 Asia-Pacific Advanced Network (APAN) 
APAN (Asia-Pacific Advanced Network [APAN], n.d.) started in 1997. APAN is the 
research consortium as well as it operates a next generation Internet service. The 
bandwidths of the backbone networks of APAN in 1998 were between 1 Mbps and 35 Mbps. 
The US next generation Internet project “very high speed  Backbone Network Service” 
(vBNS) already had 155 Mbps bandwidth service in their backbone network. The operating 
policy of APAN was to provide high performance data transfer service, because, in 1998, it 
was still impossible to implement a huge bandwidth network in the Asia Pacific area. Now, 
the APAN network covers the Asia Pacific area, providing bandwidth between 45 Mbps and 
10 Gbps. In 2011, APAN became the none-profit organization and APAN strongly supports 
the research activities over the R&E networks in Asia Pacific area. 
2.3 Trans-Eurasian Information Network 2 (TEIN2) 
TEIN or TEIN1 was an EU project that connected Europe and Korea. It started with a 
bandwidth of 10 Mbps. TEIN2 (Delivery of Advanced Network Technology to Europe 
[DANTE], n.d.) is a bit different from TEIN in that it has two goals. One is to provide an 
access network to Europe, and the other is to develop an interconnection network in the 
Southeast Asian area whose bandwidth is between 45 Mbps and 1 Gbps. The main 
characteristic of the design topology is that it is not the star-shaped. That is, the TEIN2 
network itself has its own backbone with connecting the four NOCs, and the number of 
routes for communicating between NOCs are more than two. It provides each Southeast 
Asian site with several routes to access the others. TEIN3 started in 2010 and TW, KH, LA, 
IN, LK, NP, PK, BD and BT (Tbl. 3) joined this activity. 
3. Background of R&E network 
3.1 R&E network status in 2006 
In the old star-shaped R&E network topology (Fig. 1) communication between the point 
sites had to go through the center of the star. Communication along these routes was 
frequently delayed due to the configuration. Now, however, the R&E network community 
has grown, and the former point sites are now sometimes the center of a star. In some cases 
this growth generated several routes between two sites (Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 1. Star shaped R&E networks(Robb, 2006) 
 
 
Fig. 2. Actual R&E networks(Robb, 2006) 
This complicated topology made the operation of the R&E networks more difficult. To 
simplify operations, Research and Education Network Operators Group (RENOG), 
(Research and Education Network Operators Group [RENOG], n.d.) was developed and 
started reconfiguring the complicated and unstable routing. However, in the APAN area, 
the complicated routing unexpectedly worked and it was able to maintain high-speed 
communication with most of the network researchers, though with some delay. Network 
engineers like the word “redundancy” but most of the network engineers in the APAN area 
did not expect that the complicated topology and the complicated routing information 
would work so well in an emergency. 
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3.2 Before the earthquake 
The TEIN2 project started in 2006. Before that, the network topology style in Asia Pacific 
area was close to the star shape. Most of the networks in the APAN area started in Japan, 
and if a network did not start from Japan, it started from one of the point sites. That is why 
the star shape was kept. However, the TEIN2 topology does not look like a star. Even inside 
TEIN2, there are two or three routes to reach any other sites. An engineering meeting was 
held before TEIN2 started at which an agreement on routing policy seemed to have been 
reached. However, after TEIN2 started, there happened some of routing troubles in Asian 
Pacific area. A few troubles were from TEIN2 network directly but others were the routing 
advertise issues from the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) of the 
TEIN2. To solve these problems, the operators held many meetings to develop tools. One 
tool summarized traffic conditions for each route (Asia-Pacific Advanced Network Japan 
[APAN-JP], n.d.). Another was a database to record preferable routes for each XP 
(Kurokawa, 2006). These were essentially monitoring and advising tools, not route 
configuration tools. Actual operations were done at the XPs based on the database, which 
was built by the database tool (Kurokawa, 2006). At the APAN Tokyo XP, the abstract of the 
routing policy was as follows. 
 Communication with ID, SG, MY, TH, VN, CN, and AU (Tbl. 3) should be routed 
through TEIN2. 
 Communication with PH should be direct.  
 Communication with Micronesia should be routed through the Hawaii XP. 
 Communication with TW should be direct. 
 Generic communication with EU should be through US. 
 Communication with US should be direct. 
Figure 3 shows the one of the worst examples of communication between US university 
through KR. That is, if a university in US established communication with Merit or the 
University of Michigan, the packets were transferred through KR. In such a case, TCP-based 
applications often met with communication problems. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Incorrect routing between universities in US through KR(Robb, 2006) 
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4. Network failures caused by Taiwan earthquake 
4.1 Fiber breaks 
On December 26th, 2006 (UTC+9) there were two huge earthquakes near Taiwan. The first 
earthquake happened at 20:26 (UTC+8) (Academia Sinica, n.d.a), and the second one at 20:34 
(UTC+8) (Academia Sinica, n.d.b). Fortunately, the earthquakes took place under the sea 
and the cities in TW were not heavily damaged, as happened in 1999. However, these two 
earthquakes did cause landslides over a wide area on the seabed near the Taiwan island. At 
04:00 (UTC+9) on December 27th 2006, that is, after the second earthquake, the R&E 
networks in the Asian area were shutdown. The cable companies investigated the reason for 
the lost connection and found that the earthquake had caused damage to the cable systems. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Fiber cut area around Taiwan island (Konishi, 2007) 
The circle in Fig. 4 shows the area where the cable systems were cut off. Most of the fiber 
cables in the eastern Asia area went through southwestern Taiwan. These cables were 
generally bought and shared by different telecom companies. 
4.2 Internet disconnections and lost BGP peerings 
After the earthquake, both commodity Internet traffic and R&E traffic were cut off. For 
instance, the JP-PH, JP-CN, JP-SG, CN-US, HK-KR, TW-(HK+CN), and TW-SG connections 
were lost. That is, the R&E network communities were divided into two groups. One was 
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the group that consisted of JP, KR, TW, and US, and the other consisted of CN, HK, VN, MY, 
TH, SG, ID, and PH (Fig 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Splitted R&E networks in Asia Pacific area 
The Internet disconnection occurred in the following order.  
1. Link-layer disconnection because of the fiber cut 
2. Lost primary BGP peerings  
3. Automatic BGP re-routing along the alternative peer if any 
 
 
Fig. 6. Traffic weather map on Dec.27 2006 
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Figure 6 shows the Internet traffic weather map at APAN Tokyo XP (APAN-JP, n.d.), which 
displays connectivity and link utilization in real time. In Fig. 6 it can be observed that the JP-
HK-CN, JP-TH, JP-SG, and JP-PH communications were lost and that there was 0% link 
utilization except a 100 Mbps load between JP and KR. 
The link-layer disconnection caused BGP sessions to expire. BGP peerings from JP to 
HK+CN, TH, SG, and PH were lost and automatically diverted to detour routes.  
In general, when traffic is transferred to the detour AS routes, the traffic will flow along the 
longer AS path rather than the usual one, because the shortest AS path will be selected as 
the primary AS path according to BGP policy.  
 
 
Fig. 7. Number of IP prefixes that experienced AS path changes (2006.12.26 - 2006.12.27 at 
QGPOP) 
Figure 7 shows the AS path changes of each IP prefix observed just after earthquake from the 
QGPOP (Kyushu GigaPOP Project [QGPOP], n.d.) BGP router in JP. It can be seen in Fig. 7 
that more than 1000 IP prefixes experienced AS path changes after the earthquake. 
4.3 Traffic load changes 
Fortunately, despite the earthquake, the CN-KR and KR-JP cables were unbroken. 
Therefore, we were able to observe the detour traffic along these links due to BGP re-
routing.  
Figure 8 shows the traffic between JP and KR on Dec. 27th, 2006. At about 04:30 (UTC+9) the 
inbound traffic pattern between JP and KR had changed dramatically. At the same time, as 
can be seen in Fig. 9, the traffic between JP and PH disappeared. 
The reason for the traffic change could be inferred from the routing policy of APAN 
Tokyo XP. The route from CN to JP through KR was one of the lowest priority routes, but 
after the earthquake, it was chosen because there were no available BGP routes with high 
priorities. 
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Fig. 8. Traffic between JP and KR on Dec.27 (UTC+9)} 
 
 
Fig. 9. Traffic between JP and PH on Dec.27 (UTC+9) 
4.4 Changes of BGP routing tables 
Table 1 shows the registered routing policy table of the Asia Pacific R&E networks. It can be 
observed that ASTI (PH) lost connectivity to the R&E networks, that CSTNET (CN) lost 
eastbound routes, and that APAN-JP (JP) lost connectivity to TEIN2.  
CERNET (CN) had a direct connection to TW, but after the earthquake its connection was 
expected to be changed to the path through US, as shown in Fig. 10. But, the routing policy 
arrangement was different between JP and KR. The forward path between CN and TW chose 
the route through JP but the return path chose the route through US as shown in Fig. 11. 
In addition, routing from JP to the “west” Asian networks (Fig. 5) was connected through 
US. The direct link between CSTNET (CN) and US was also damaged. 
Both CERNET and APAN Tokyo XP expect that the detour for JP-CN traffic should be 
through US, not through KR. Figure 10 shows the expected BGP route and the actual route 
between APAN-TW and CN. Since only APAN Tokyo XP implemented the strict routing 
policy, the CN traffic chose the shortest AS path. However, the traffic from JP to CN chose a 
routing policy that does not choose the route through KR. 
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Src\Dst APAN-JP 
(JP) 
CERNET
(CN) 
APAN-
TW 
(TW) 
KOREN 
(KR) 
ASTI 
(PH) 
CSTNET 
(CN) 
TEIN2 SingAREN
(SG) 
UniNet 
(TH) 
ThaiSARN 
(TH) 
KREONET2 
(KR) 
AARNET 
(AU) 
APAN-
JP 
 D direct direct U C U direct D U US US 
Hawaii 
CERNET D  D direct U N.A. TEIN2 TEIN2 TEIN2 TEIN2 TEIN2 TEIN2 
APAN-
TW 
direct D  APAN-
JP 
U U N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. APAN-JP APAN-
JP 
KOREN direct direct APAN-
JP 
 U U TEIN2 TEIN2 TEIN2 TEIN2 direct TEIN2 
ASTI U U U U  U U U U U U U 
CSTNET C N.A. U U U  N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. U N.A. 
TEIN2 U TEIN2 N.A. TEIN2 U N.A.  TEIN2 TEIN2 TEIN2 KOREN TEIN2 
D: Detoured path through US U:  unreachable 
C: Commodity link connection N.A. Non applicable 
Table 1. The monitored routing table for each R&E network on Dec.27 2006 (Kurokawa, 
2006) 
 
 
Fig. 10. BGP route changes of APAN before earthquake (Dec. 2006) 
 
 
Fig. 11. BGP route changes of APAN after earthquake (Dec. 2006) 
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4.5 AS-level topology changes 
To investigate the BGP route changes in detail, we used an AS-topology visualization tool 
called “ABEL2” (Sakiyama et al., 2006) that utilizes BGP routing tables that are stored every 
10 minutes.  
 
 
Fig. 12. After the earthquake at 19:30, Dec. 27 (UTC+9) 2006, the route from APAN-KR to 
GÉANT was diverted to a long AS path of (APAN-KR, APAN-JP, TransPAC, Abilene, 
GÉANT) 
 
 
Fig. 13. Reconfigured AS path from APAN-KR to GÉANT (APAN-KR, CERNET, TEIN2-N, 
GÉANT) at 20:30, Dec. 27 (UTC+9) 2006 
Figures 12, 13, and 14 show the changes between APAN-KR (AS9270) and GÉANT 
(AS20965) by the number of IP prefixes. It can be observed in Fig. 12, that just after the 
earthquake, at 19:30 on December 27th (UTC+9), 2006, the route from APAN-KR to 
GÉANT was diverted to the long AS path APAN-KR - APAN-JP - TransPAC (US) - 
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Abilene (US) – GÉANT (Tbl. 4) because of the TEIN2 link outage. Therefore, to connect 
APAN-KR to GÉANT with a shorter AS path, the operator configured the BGP routing 
policy to make CERNET (CN) announce GÉANT prefixes. As shown in Fig. 13, the route 
from APAN-KR to GÉANT was switched through CERNET at 20:30 on Dec. 27th 
(UTC+9), 2006. At 20:50 on Dec. 17th, 2006 (UTC+9), the TEIN2-SG NOC announced the 
route to EU, too. Since the link bandwidth between SG and KR is larger than that between 
CN and KR, the operator made a configuration for BGP routers to choose the AS path 
with the KR-SG link (Fig. 14). 
 
 
Fig. 14. Reconfigured AS path from APAN-KR to GÉANT through TEIN2-SG at 20:50, Dec. 
27 (UTC+9) 2006 
4.6 Delay changes 
When Australia's Research and Education Network (AARNET) proposed that it would 
transit all the traffic of TEIN2 members (CN, SG, VN, MY, TH, ID), a flow data analysis was 
done and most of the traffic was found to be for Eastern Asia. 
The APAN Tokyo XP and the TEIN2 NOC asked the AARNET NOC to route the TEIN2 
traffic through Honolulu rather than through Seattle, because the traffic was between the 
Eastern Asia and TEIN2 members. The shorter Round Trip Time (RTT) worked better,  
especially with TCP-based applications (Tbl. 5). However, this operation occupied the link 
between Honolulu and Tokyo, because the bandwidth between Tokyo and Honolulu is 155 
Mbps and the one between the Tokyo and TEIN2 NOCs is 622 Mbps and the one between 
AARNET and TEIN2 is 1 Gbps (Fig. 15). 
The link between KR and JP, whose bandwidth was 10 Gbps, was up. According to the 
analysis, the KR-JP link still had space to carry the traffic, and this route is much shorter 
than the route through Australia. 
The TEIN2 and AARNET NOCs and the Tokyo XP stopped routing the TEIN2 traffic 
through Australia, and the KR transit policy was initiated. But the bandwidth between CN 
and KR was also 155 Mbps, too, so the link was occupied again (Fig. 16). 
At that moment, the JGNII JP-SG link (Tbl. 4) was restored, but after precise check by the 
engineers, it looked as though the telecommunication company had switched the route and 
provided connectivity. TEIN2 NOC and the Tokyo XP decided to separate the traffic to 
Tokyo into two routes. That is, CN traffic was transferred through KR, and other TEIN2 
traffic was transferred through SG (Fig. 17). 
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Fig. 15. TEIN2 traffic was carried through Hawaii. 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. TEIN2 traffic was routed through KR. 
On December 27th after the fiber cut, automatic BGP re-routing has been carried out 
between SG and JP. The route from SG to JP became SG-AU-Hawaii-JP instead of the direct 
link and its RTT was increased to 426 ms, while its normal RTT is around 88 ms. 
When the link between SG and KR was temporarily recovered with the backup fiber, the 
RTT values was 240 ms between SG and JP via KR on December 28th. 
Finally, on January 12th when the link between JP and SG was recovered with the direct 
fiber, the RTT was reduced to 113 ms, which is slightly increased than the usual case. 
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Fig. 17. TEIN2 traffic was routed through SG and KR. 
Figure 18 shows the RTT between SG and JP just after the earthquake and the recovery 
process. 
 
 
Fig. 18. RTT between SG and JP during the restoration process 
5. Network restoration methods 
After the network failures caused by the earthquake, several restoration steps were taken to 
restore communication. In this subsection, we discuss these steps. 
5.1 Automatic BGP re-routing 
Usually, the full BGP routing table includes a few “useless” routes (Tbl. 2). By “useless” we 
mean that the route itself provides only connectivity with the long RTT and insufficient 
bandwidth. Therefore, the network operators filter out such useless routes by setting the 
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local preference to ignore them. However, after the earthquake, these useless BGP routes 
worked automatically as backup paths. In the Asia Pacific R&E networks, the routes became 
very complicated after TEIN2 started because TEIN2 provided a few unexpected routes 
around the world. Because there were backup AS paths, automatic BGP re-routing could be 
used for first aid to provide the connectivity to the ASs that lost the primary paths. 
However, automatic BGP re-routing did not consider the traffic engineering parameters of 
the available bandwidth and the backup traffic load. 
 
(Src, Dst) Usual Path Useless Path 
(JP, TEIN2) JP-TEIN2 JP-Hawaii/Seattle-AU-TEIN2 
(TEIN2, JP) TEIN2-JP TEIN2-GÉANT2-Abilene-JP 
(US, US) Abilene   US-KREONET2-JP-TransPAC2-US 
(JP, KR)   JP-KR link JP-TEIN2-JP- TEIN2-SG -AU-Seattle-KR 
Table 2. Examples of the “useless routes” 
5.2 Traffic engineering with BGP policy change 
BGP by itself does not provide any information regarding link capacity or available 
bandwidth. Moreover, due to recent VLAN (Varadaraja, 1997) technology, the distance 
between two ASs has no relation to physical distance. Thus, QoS information of the detour 
routes must be examined by the operators. This makes systems reliant on human knowledge 
of traffic engineering. To remove the congestion due to the long detour AS path, we 
changed the BGP routing policy as shown in Fig. 13 and Fig. 14. 
The members of TEIN2 (VN, MY, SG, ID, PH) lost their connections to APAN Tokyo XP 
because the fiber broke. AARNET NOC proposed backup routes for accessing APAN Tokyo 
XP through AU and Hawaii. However, this solution caused congestion on both the CN-KR 
and Hawaii-JP links. Besides, CN traffic took an asymmetrical path. 
Therefore, to solve the traffic engineering issue, Tokyo XP made a decision to divide CN 
traffic by announcing CN IP prefixes through KR NOC and grouping CN prefixes at Tokyo 
XP. The results were monitored by Cisco NetFlow (CISCO, n.d.). The operators found out 
that half of the KR traffic was from CN. After a careful examination, it was discovered that a 
part of the CN traffic was from CERNET but the other part was from TEIN2.  
 
 
Fig. 19. Traffic from KR monitored at APAN JP (Dec. 26 2006 - Jan. 26 2007)} 
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Figure 19 shows the traffic load for each source AS. Although the total traffic is about 0.4 
Gbps, the real KR traffic was about 0.2 Gbps. 0.1 Gbps is occupied by CERNET traffic and 
the rest by TEIN2.  
5.3 Port reconfiguration 
In spite of the recovery steps, a few sites that had only single-link connections to the Internet 
could not directly reach the R&E networks. Therefore, after the fiber was fixed, a few single-
link sites had the connections via Internet commodity service. To fix this problem, the 
operators had to change the port configuration at switches that were able to provide high 
performance connections. 
Two days after the earthquake, the link between KR and SG was restored and SG started 
making routing announcements to TEIN2 members (ID, SG, TH, MY). However, the link 
between SG and KR was not the original fiber, and its RTT increased greatly because a 
detour route was assigned. Similarly, the direct link between PH and JP was replaced with a 
detour route with a long RTT. When an online demonstration was being prepared for the 
2007 APAN meeting held in PH between January 22nd and 26th 2007, the restored JP-PH 
link had a very long RTT because it went through mainland China, as shown in Fig. 20. 
 
 
Fig. 20. JP-PH detour route circuit 
During the 23rd APAN meeting demonstration, the Prince of Wales Hospital at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong (CUHK) was expected to join. However, its IP prefix was 
announced only by CSTNET. Thus, it was only reachable over a commodity Internet link 
with a small bandwidth. To solve this problem, APAN Tokyo XP changed the port 
configuration of fibers. That is, the CSTNET fiber for accessing APAN Tokyo XP was 
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plugged to the TEIN2-HK router. Finally, CUHK was directly connected to TEIN2. Finally, 
with this solution, CUHK and CSTNET were supplied with huge-bandwidth and short-RTT 
connections to the R&E network. 
6. Lessons 
From the process of recovering from network failures across several ISP’s in Asia Pacific 
R&E networks, we encountered several network management challenges especially 
regarding fault management. In this subsection, we describe the lessons learned during the 
recovery operations. 
6.1 Fault-tolerant fiber topology design 
BGP routing policies are usually made to avoid asymmetric or useless AS paths by setting 
the appropriate local preference values. However, these alternative AS paths worked as 
backup paths. Before the network failures from earthquake, Asia Pacific R&E network 
operators thought that removing the useless routes was urgent, because routing became too 
complicated after TEIN2 started. However, this complicated routing was able to provide 
valuable connections during network failures. This shows that maintaining full-mesh style 
routing information is very important for fault-tolerant routing. 
Though BGP re-routing over the redundant AS paths was successful for the first step in 
restoration, it was not sufficient to provide full backup service without congestion by 
considering the traffic load. Since BGP routing does not carry QoS information, such as link 
capacity, link utilization, or available bandwidth, traffic re-routed to the backup AS path 
had experienced poor QoS, such as long delays. Therefore, QoS-aware BGP routing or traffic 
engineering-aware BGP routing is necessary. 
6.2 Integrated network management 
During the restoration process, we used various network monitoring tools such as an MRTG 
(Oetiker, n.d.a), a network weather map, a BGP routing table visualizer, and a flow monitor. 
At first, the link outage was noticed on the network weather map, and the abrupt change of 
traffic load was noticed on the MRTG. However, the fast fault detection method that 
encompasses physical, link, routing, and application layers is necessary because it was able 
to identify the exact failure points and visualize their impacts on the network. In addition, a 
simulator or emulator that could show the results with the network topology and the traffic 
load before and after failures would be very useful in predicting the effects of fault-
management decisions. While we took various restoration steps, we had to process the 
information collected by each different network-monitoring tool. Finally, the operators 
interpreted the situation and implemented recovery decisions manually. If the iperf 
(GOOGLE, n.d) or bwctl (INTERNET2, n.d.) is available throughout the network, the end-
to-end available bandwidth between ASs can be easily estimated. For example, to access 
Sydney from Tokyo, there are two possible routes. One is Tokyo – Seattle - Sydney, and the 
other is Tokyo – Honolulu - Sydney. The former provides 10 Gbps but has a long RTT. The 
latter route includes a bottleneck along the 155 Mbps path but has a short RTT. In addition, 
to make the final decision, we had to check the flow data, because MRTG or RRDTool 
(Oetiker, n.d.b) do not classify traffic breakdowns by their source/destination ASs. When 
the traffic from KR increased suddenly, the operators could not understand the reasons. 
This shows that integrated network monitoring or management systems would be very 
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useful for collecting information from several independent monitoring systems and for 
providing the correct information in an integrated wide view in case of significant network 
failures. 
6.3 Emergency communication between operators 
After the earthquake, communication among NOCs was difficult because the fiber break 
disrupted VoIP and legacy telephone service. Moreover, the earthquake happened on 
December 26th 2006, overlapping with the Christmas holiday. Thus, all the communication 
was routed over the instant messaging system and e-mails were routed over the detoured 
network even though it provided poor quality service. It became obvious that the 
emergency communication should be guaranteed in case of failures so that the recovery 
process can be started quickly 
7. Summary 
Since the Internet continues to grow globally and becomes ever more important in daily life, 
business, and research, the need for fault-tolerant service in network management becomes 
more urgent. However, during the network failures caused by the 2006 earthquake, it was 
shown that there are still many challenges in fault-tolerant network management research. 
Even though multiple fiber cores are installed together to provide backup service, they may 
be useless during severe natural disasters. Therefore, full-mesh or fiber-disjoint physical 
network topology should be designed for use during failures. On the available topology, it 
was seen that BGP routing provided backup AS paths, which was useful for the first step in 
restoration. However, the traffic engineering issues during restoration were difficult to solve 
because all the information, such as link capacity, available bandwidth, link delay, traffic 
load, and routing policy, had to be collected, interpreted, and acted on by human operators. 
In spite of BGP re-routing, we had to deal with a few single-link ASs to establish direct 
connections to the R&E networks. From this experience of network recovery during a 
significant natural disaster affecting several different countries and ISP’s, we were able to 
gather valuable information on network management during emergencies. Therefore, in the 
Internet of the future, designers should focus on fault-tolerant network management study 
including robust physical topology, cross-layer restoration, traffic engineering combined 
with BGP routing, and simulation of failures in the network.  
We would like to show the one example from this lesson. In August 2009, the earthquake 
happened again near Taiwan island and the fiber cut happened again. Table 1 tool was 
improved as “Compath” already and the table was constructed again for this disaster 
(Kurokawa, 2010). At that time, the medical demonstration was planned in Asian area and 
the connectivity of the Thailand was required. The compath table recommended that the 
TW should have become the hub for the southeast Asian area. This was against the policy of 
TEIN2, but the R&E networks object is to support the researchers and such the flexibility 
was approved and the tool from the lesson of the 2006 earthquake improved the network 
operations. 
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9. Appendix 
 
Country code Name 
JP Japan 
TH Thailand 
MY Malaysia 
HK Hong Kong 
ID Indonesia 
SG Singapore 
TW Taiwan 
CN China 
US United States of America 
KR Korea 
VN Vietnam 
PH The Philipppines 
NP Nepal 
AU Australia 
BD Bangladesh 
IN India 
LK Sri Lanka 
BT Bhutan 
KH Cambodia 
LA Laos 
PK Pakistan 
Table 3. ISO 3166 Country Code (International Organization for Standardization [ISO], n.d.) 
in this chapter 
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Network Name Description Area 
AIII  Asian Internet 
Interconnection Initiatives 
JP, VN, PH, TH, MY, SG, 
ID, NP 
APAN  Asia-Pacific Advanced 
Network 
JP, KR, CN, TW, HK, VN, 
TH, MY, SG, AU, NZ, PK, 
IN, KL, BD 
TEIN2  Trans-Eurasia Information 
Network 2 
JP, CN, VN, PH, TH, MY, 
SG, ID, AU, EU 
TEIN3 Trans-Eurasia Information 
Network 3 
AU, BD, BT, KH, CN, IN, 
ID, JP, KR, LA, MY, NP, 
PK, PH, SG, LK, TW, TH, 
VN 
ASTI  Advanced Science and 
Technology Institute, the 
link owner of PREGINET 
PH 
PREGINET  Philippine Research 
Education and Government 
Information Network 
PH 
CSTNET China Science & Tecnology 
Network 
CN 
CERNET  China Education and 
Research Network 
CN 
GÉANT  R&E Network, the AS 
registration name 
Europe 
GÉANT2  R&E Network Europe 
KOREN Korea Advanced Research 
Network 
KR 
SingAREN Singapore Advanced 
Research and Education 
Network 
SG 
UniNet  inter University Network TH 
ThaiSARN Thai Social/Scientific 
Academic and Research 
Network 
TH 
KREONET2 Korea Research 
Environment Open Network 
2, the domestic name is 
KREONET 
KR 
AARNET  Australia's Research and 
Education Network 
AU 
QGPOP Kyushu Gigapop JP 
JGNII Japanese R&E Network JP, US, TH, SG 
Table 4. Network Name 
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OSI Model 
 Data unit Layer Function 
Host 
layers 
Data 7. Application Network Process to application 
6. Presentation Data representation and 
encryption 
5. Session Interhost communication 
Segment/Datagram 4. Transport End-toend connections and 
reliability 
Media 
layers 
Packet 3. Network Path determination and logical 
addressing 
Frame 2. Data Link Physical addressing (MAC & 
LLC) 
Bit 1. Physical Media signal and binary 
transmission 
Table 5. Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Basic Reference Model 
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